@article{oai:tokyo-metro-u.repo.nii.ac.jp:00002068,
 author = {カワシゲ, リュウイチロウ and kawashige, Ryuichiro and 河重, 隆一郎},
 issue = {11},
 journal = {経営と制度},
 month = {Mar},
 note = {In this article, the non-negativity constraint on the marginal production-cost
binding, we show the range of the exogenous variables and the corner equilibrium
as the outcome of the two-stage game in which two firms invest in their R&D to
reduce the production-cost in the first stage and engage in the Cournot competition
in the second stage. The marginal production-cost comes to zero when the constraint
is binding it. The corner equilibrium caused by the marginal production-cost come
to zero is inferior to the interior equilibrium resulted from the negative marginal
production-cost not binded by the constraint. Seminal works, however, which stated
the outcome of the co-operative R&D is better than that of the competitive R&D
assumed to be an interior equilibrium and presented the equilibrium sought without
the constraints. The result of the seminal works is still unclear. Therefore, we reexamine the two-stage game of R&D investment., Article},
 pages = {19--34},
 title = {費用の非負制約を考慮した研究開発の協力と競争},
 year = {2013}
}