

Community Power Structure ; A Japanese Case Study

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Preface

This study aims to clarify the Community Power Structure (C.P.S) in Japanese society through the survey of a small city with a population of thirty thousand. The focus of our study is Shimoda City located at a distance of about 80 miles from Tokyo in the southern part of the Izu-Peninsula, and well known as the site of the first American consulate that Townsend Harris opened in Japan in 1856.

Our research was conducted in November 1984 and in September 1985. We would like to express our appreciation to the citizens of Shimoda who permitted themselves to be interviewed. We are indebted to both graduate and undergraduate students in the Department of Sociology at Tokyo Metropolitan University for their interest and support.

I. Identifying the Problems

The term "community" in Japanese means a traditional village community of about fifty households based on common land ownership. It used to be the lowest administrative unit of the Tokugawa feudal government and its basic components were not individuals but households. There have been recognized two types of the village communities. In one, private landownership is recognized and households are ranked accordingly in a hierarchical order. The other was an age grade system in which people were divided by age, and males or females of younger age groups used to live together in one large household. The village communities in the area of the Izu-Peninsula where Shimoda city is located are of the latter type. Most of the communities in this city area used to be fishing villages, and there were no large landowners nor large scale farmers. The distinction between the main and branch households is not salient to this area.

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* Tokyo Metropolitan University

** Aichi University

After the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the new government abolished the feudal rice tax by revising the land tax in 1873. While the older system of village community under the feudal lord's control was thus disrupted, communal regulations of farming, together with the communal solidarity of the members, were not broken up. The village community was no longer the unit of rice-tax collection. Under the land tax revision of 1873, private ownership of land was fully recognized. And tax was now assessed on the value of land.

In 1888 a new set of regulations on the structure and administration of cities, towns and villages was promulgated. Under this municipal code, several old towns and villages were incorporated into new and larger entities. The former village was downgraded to the status of hamlet, now called *buraku*, and several *burakus* formed one new village or town. For example, Suye village in Kumamoto Prefecture in 1935 was divided into eight administrative units called *ku* in most of which there were two or more hamlets (*buraku*). But communal problems pertaining to agricultural and local affairs continued to be settled at the *buraku*, and/or village level. The communal ownership of water (irrigation), waste land, forest and agrarian roads were an important basis for community life.

Some amendments to the laws of local organization were enacted in 1921. Under the former laws, the qualifications for citizenship had been limited to males over twenty-five years of age who paid taxes to the city, town or village and paid, in addition, national tax of more than two yen to the central government. Now the national tax acquirement was dropped. In 1925 universal suffrage of male over twenty-five of age was proclaimed. Before universal suffrage, voting right for the House of Representative was expanded in 1919, when direct tax eligibility for males was reduced from ten to three yen.

Thus we have had two types of communities in the process of modernization. One is a recent administrative unit and the other a traditional autonomous unit.

The term community in the context of this paper is an expedient, employed to refer to the entire area of the municipal administrative unit. What we would like to analyse is not the power structure of the traditional village community but the power structure of the whole city administrative unit including these traditional communities which have been in transition toward modernization and urbanization. And as far as the traditional village community is concerned, we cannot distinguish the private and civic from public and political spheres of activity when we discuss power structure.


These conditions have an effect on the evaluation of the power of the community leaders by reputational method. When we made a selective list of 134 leaders from the entire city district, and asked "Who has power in the community in this list?", local leaders would nominate up to 12 persons and rank them. Within the top 20 of the 134 leaders, there are 10 national and local politicians such as the mayor, the prefectural governor, members of the prefectural assembly, members of the Diet, and former and past mayors.

The community in the context of the studies of C. P. S. in the U. S. is one which is independent of centralized political power as shown in study by Floyd Hunter. Therefore in their definition of power, it is rather difficult to distinguish it from influences. Power in a community that has nothing to do with the state power, boils down to personal influence. Of

course, to distinguish power from authority, and control from leadership is difficult. In contrast to the traditional Japanese community in which the public or political and the private or civic spheres were not clearly separated, it seems to be taken for granted that in the community in the U.S. that the two spheres are to be separated. Therefore there often have been many debates concerning the definition of power in the U.S. sociology.

For example, Talcott Parsons criticized C. Wright Mills' zero-sum concept of power in his review of Mills' *The Power Elite*. Parsons, who maintains that power is rather a desirable commodity in the highly organized modern society, criticized Mills' standpoint as based on a romantic and anarchic assumption of power itself being an evil. In our opinion, whereas Parsons focused mainly on personal influence in the private sphere, Mills concerned himself with power in the public sphere. In his pluralistic model against Mills' centralized ruling elite model through the survey of New Haven, Robert Dahl showed that there were different decision makers concerning different issues.

But as G. William Domhoff tried to show in his book *Who Rules America?* Dahl's finding of 'pluralism' on the local level is not incompatible with the idea of a national upper class that is a governing class. On the one hand, whereas Mills denied the concept of ruling class and replaced it with the power elite in the three realms of the economic, the political and the military, Domhoff admitted the existence of a governing class based on property ownership. But Domhoff also used the concept of the power elite and related it to a governing class as shown in a following Chart 1.




On a national level, the ruling or governing class always co-opts the members from the mass. Equality of opportunity promoted by meritocratic scales in this cooptation process does not necessarily lead to democratization of society. But as Domhoff pointed out, this ruling elite model is not incompatible with the pluralistic model of local community.

On the community level power implies influence in the private sphere. Also issues can not be solved by forces of majority as in the political realm, but can only be solved by the integrated authority in the civic realm or consensus among citizens. It is necessary to distinguish between political society in which issues are decided by majority and civil society in which issues are decided by consensus or hegemony showed by citizens.

Of course, the distinction between political society and public sphere and civil society and private sphere is not substantial but analytical. As to the linkage between two, see Chart 2.

The separation between the public and the private is one of the contradictions modernization itself has produced, but it is also great achievement and positive historical product. And if participant democracy or self-government should be fully realized, then the separation between two itself would become meaningless. Thus if we take the case of municipal government, citizens enter the realm of political society by voting. Under the people's sovereignty, people have equal political rights. And by election people can send their representatives to the assembly.

Chart 2 Political Society and Civil Society



People do not only exercise voting right as a sovereignty, but also elect their political party leaders as a rank and file member of a party. As a citizen having professional occupation, he may be a part-time member of the political party. However he can elect professional political leaders, as the executives of a party. Also even though one may not be a member of a political party, he can support and contribute the party.

As far as the parliamentary or representative democracy is chosen, the government by bureaucracy is imperative. Bureaucracy has people's legitimate belief as a legal order. The power is exercised by the written rules. Also bureaucratic administration has legitimacy because the party that gets majority in the assembly can access the governmental power and organize executive staff.

When government or executive organ once established by the majority in the assembly or by an elected head such as a mayor, a governor or a President, bureaucracy became a control apparatus, and administration staffs are co-opted from citizen according to their ability. Thus not to allot a portion of the function of government to less talented persons becomes imperative.

The distinction and conjunction between political and civil society or between moment of force and of consensus are effective frame both at national level and at local community level. Distinction between public and private is rather relative and even in private organization the process to realize autonomous integration from below functions as a political process from which leadership of a political citizen should be emergent.

Today we have at least two arguments concerning to a modernization theory. One is the argument to predict the coming of post-industrial society such as Daniel Bell. He takes a three-stage theory, that is pre-industrial (pre-modern), industrial (modern) and post-industrial (post-modern). Another is the argument to predict the coming of Japanese culture, i. e., that the end of the stage of modernization occurs as Japan catches up. That is the declaration of the 'conquest of modernity,' and the prospect of transition from the 'age of modernity' to the 'age of post-modernity.' Thus the Japanese pattern is characterised by tendency for some elements of pre-industrial communities to be revitalized in the process of new group formation in the post-modern phase. In addition, the revitalization is facilitated by two competing positions, that of conservatives on one hand, and that of progressives on the other.

This argument is congruent with the theme of the 'return to Japanese tradition.' For example, the late Prime Minister Ohira asserted that 'material civilization based on modern rationalism has arrived at the point of saturation. We are now shifting away from the modern age to the age which transcends it away from the economy-centred age to the culture-centred age.'

The 'age of culture' at the same time means the 'age of local community.' There are two currents in these assertion. One is an ideological campaign connected with the ultra-nationalistic movement, and the other is the citizen movement to realize democratic self-government. To the latter regard, Japanese political culture has an indigenous potential for so-called direct democracy. Until recent time, people believe that the government tells the people what to do, but now it turns the other way around.

II. The Historical Background

In 1896 Shimoda became a town and in 1955 it incorporated with neighbor five villages. There are several hamlets in each five former villages as we show following.

Former Town and Villages	1 Shimoda (Former Town)	2 Inousawa	3 Inazusa	4 Shirahama	5 Hamazaki	6 Asahi
		1 Hongo	1 Suhara	1 Harada	1 Susaki	1 Ohkamo
		2 Naka	2 Yokoyama	2 Nagata	2 Kakizaki	2 Kisami
Hamlets		3 Kouchi	3 Minosaku	3 Itado	3 Sotoura	3 Tauchi
		4 Tatuno	4 Kazono			
		5 Rendaiji	5 Ohuchi			
		6 Ohsawa				

In 1971 Shimoda city was born. Total population is thirty one thousands in 1980 and in an area of former town there live ten thousands.

In this area, we had three traditional village communities, 1) mountain villages, 2) fishing villages and 3) semi-fishing and semi-agricultural villages. Before World War II, each hamlet had communal land which shared by formal households in the community. These households had responsibility of allotments of all expenses. The village community was divided into *kumi* which consisted of several household communities. In *kumi*, there were young male's and female's *kumi*. Young people whose age were fifteen to thirty lived together in one large

household which existed in each *kumi*. Young males were expected to become a member of a fire brigade, to help villagers in a case of emergency and to assist funeral and marriage ceremony of villagers.

In former Shimoda town there has been a good harbor and once was a center for marine transportation since 1636, when Tokugawa government had set office. In Edo period, there developed ship building business and were meant ship carpenters. But since Meiji period, transportation by rail roads became dominant, and after the Tokaido line from Tokyo to Osaka was set, the harbor became less and less important. However as corresponding to the shift from a boat to steamer in Meiji, new ship building business was established in 1898 with new technology by local capital. The ship building industry and related industries were main ones in Shimoda town at that time.

Before the rail road from Ito to Shimoda was established in 1961, the main transportation

Table 1 Household Members by Industry 1954

Industry	Household Members
All industries	100.0%(8920)
Agriculture	1.6
Forestry and hunting	0.2
Fisheries and aquaculture	60.3
Mining	0.0
Construction	8.5
Manufacturing	17.5
Wholesale and retail	22.1
Finance and insurance	1.5
Real estate business	0.1
Communication and public utilities	8.4
Services	22.7
Government	6.7
No jobs	4.6

had been bus that owned privately by the business whose head office was located in Shimoda town. In the northern part of the city there is a hot spring source from which hot water is drawn. There has been hot spring hotels and inns in the central place of the town. There were 32 hotels and inns in 1960. The population of Shimoda town by household and by industry in 1954 is shown Table 1. The industries which most households in Shimoda town pursued were services (22.7%) and wholesale and retail (22.1) and manufacturing (17.5). Upon such economic base the conflicts of

political power were developed at the time before the Izukyu rail road was constructed. Kinds of the old established family which people regarded as the most privileged were 1) families of main traditional ship agencies, 2) families held and managed main hotels and inns, 3) families held and managed a ship building company, 4) families held and managed a bus company. Especially the presidents of these two big companies in Shimoda town at that time had large economic influences. Also families of these two executives were relatives and both had career of mayor.

After the Izukyu line was opened to traffic in 1961, the industrial structure in Shimoda city changed greatly. The population of Shimoda city area by industry from 1960 to 1980 is shown in Table 2. In 1965, after four years from the opening of a rail road, population of agriculture and forestry and fisheries declined from 35.5% to 23.9% in contrast with the fact that population of services increased from 17.5% to 25.6% and that of wholesale and retail from 16.8% to 20.3%. These trends have continued in these days. In 1980 population of

Table 2 Employed Persons by Industry (percent)

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980
All Industries	100(13339)	100(14003)	100(16037)	100(16176)	100(15522)
Agriculture	28.4	18.7	14.0	8.2	6.2
Forestry and Hunting	2.3	1.0	0.3	3.2	0.3
Fisheries and Aquaculture	4.8	4.3	3.3	2.8	3.0
Mining	1.1	0.7	0.3	0.2	0.1
Construction	9.2	8.5	8.5	10.0	9.1
Manufacturing	6.3	6.6	7.3	7.1	7.5
Wholesale and Retail	16.8	20.3	23.3	24.3	26.0
Finance and Insurance	1.1	1.4	1.6	1.8	2.2
Real Estate Business	0.1	0.2	6.0	7.5	6.6
Communication and Transportation	7.0	8.5	8.5	7.3	7.1
Electricity, Gas and Water Services	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.8
Services	17.4	25.6	28.2	33.1	33.1
Government	4.8	3.4	3.3	3.3	3.8

agriculture is 6.2 % and that of fisheries is 3.0 % and whereas that of services is 33.1 % and that of wholesale and retail is 26.0%.

As a rail road was open, there had been rapid growth of population to come to Shimoda as a sightseeing tour. People come to Shimoda for sea bathing in summer and for hot spring bathing in other seasons. Izu-Peninsula had been a place for honeymoon before it was replaced by Hawaii. In 1962, there were double tourists as compared with them in 1961, and number of tourists increased 6.5 times of 1961 in 1970. As corresponding to the increasing number of tourists, the number of accommodations was also increased. Hot spring hotels and inns increased from 32 in 1960 to 61 in 1971. Simplified accommodations which are managed by some ordinary house holders were 50 in the city area in 1960 and 230 in 1970.

Izuky Rail Company by which the new line was constructed has developed Shimoda as a tourist city. This company belongs the Tokyu Group which has been involved in extended transportation and tourist operations such as department stores, rail roads, hotels, buses and others. It undertook the development of tourist, bus and hotel industries in Shimoda city and constructed thousand resort facilities. The old families have been ruined by competition with companies of the Tokyu Group. Owners and managers of hotels and inns, and those of the bus company who had power in the city before the opening of the railroad lost their power and influences. Families of the owner of the only remaining ship building company had transferred its management rights to a major national fishing corporation.

So-called 'oil shock' in 1973 was a symbol of the decline of Japanese economic growth which was sustained throughout the 1960s, and a series of earthquakes in 1974, 1977 and 1978 damaged the image of Shimoda as a tourist city. The peak of population of Shimoda city area was 32,040 in 1976. The population has since been declining and is down to 30,623 in 1985. And now revitalization of Shimoda city is pursued especially by younger generations. Business in Shimoda has become dull and Izuky which once held relatively important sway in the economy of Shimoda suffered heavy investment losses in real estate in the wake of the oil

crisis in 1973, making up the beginning of a steady decline of the economic position of the Tokyu Group in the peninsula. Another service-transportation conglomerate, Seibu group, has subsequently stepped into pick up the slack, bringing in more fashionable seaside sports such as yachting, surfing and wind surfing. Playing upon the initial letters of the acronyms of the two rival conglomerate, which respectably spells 'East (TO-)' and 'West (SEI-),' locals like to speak of the East-West confrontation.

III. Who Has Power in the Community?

Before examination of the power structure of Shimoda, we would first of all like to give some basic information about political affairs in the city. As shown in Table 3, the majority of the members of the city assembly are members of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). LDP has occupied 20 seats in every election. In 1971 and 1975 nonpartisan members held five and all of them were constituents of conservative elements almost indistinguishable from the LDP. Therefore in 1971 only two members of the Komei Party (KMP) and one member of the Communist Party (JCP) formed a counterforce against the establishment, and both of the two parties increased their members in the assembly each by one from 1971 to 1975. Since 1979 there has been no nonpartisan members in the assembly, and in 1979 the three parties increased their members; Democratist Socialist Party (DSP) added three, Socialist Party (JSP) one and LDP one.

Since 1983 the total membership of the assembly has decreased from thirty to twenty-six, and from that total of four, LDP lost two, KMP two and JSP one in 1983. In 1984 a DSP assembly man Mr. Iketani, ran for the mayoralty and won. At an off year election, a member of the LDP won. Therefore, at present, the distribution of the membership of the assembly is; LDP 20, DSP 2, KMP 2, JCP 2. Among LDP members, there have been two factions split according to their connections to individual Diet members.

As to the mayor's election, the candidates for election and the numbers of votes they got from 1968 to 1984 are shown in Table 4. As one can see, in each election it was a close race. Mayoralty had been held by Mr. Ishii from 1968 to 1976. 1976 Mr. Aoki from old Shimoda, defeated Mr. Nagatomo from Hamazaki by small margin, and in 1980 Mr. Aoki was reelected defeating ex-mayor Mr. Ishii. It is very interesting to note that when a mayor tried to run in

Table 3 Members of the City Assembly by Parties

	1971	1875	1979	1983	1896
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)	21	20	21	19	20 Faction A 8 Faction B 8 Neutral 4
Democratic Socialist Party (DSP)	0	0	3	3	2
Komei Party (KMP)	2	3	3	2	2
Socialist Party (JSP)	0	0	1	0	0
Communist Party (JCP)	1	2	2	2	2
Nonpartisan	5	5	0	0	0
Total	29	30	30	26	26

the next election as a LDP member, rival candidates also in LDP called themselves non-partisans. In 1984 Mr. Iketani calling himself a nonpartisan but actually a DSP member, won the mayoralty. There was only a difference of 486 voter. It was the first time that the incumbent mayor was defeated and a candidate from the opposite party won. This caused the appointment of the main posts in the city government such as the deputy mayor and treasurer to be delayed by a veto in the assembly. We show the numbers of votes in the Shimoda city election of each candidate for the Diet in 1983, as a reference in Table 5.

To discover who has power in the community we gathered the informations from about three hundred persons through interviews and documents. Then we made preliminary lists by

sectors of political, economic and socio-cultural leaders. They were given scores by several informants who were asked to select important persons in each section. According to the

Table 5 Election of Members of the Diet in 1983

Candidate	Party	Hometown	Numbers of Votes in Shimoda
H. Kurihara	LDP	Mishima	○ 2,938
S. Saito	LDP	Fuij	○ 2,105
T. Tsuruya	JCP	Numazu	× 492
S. Katsumata	JSP	Gotenba	○ 3,648
R. Watanabe	DSP	Numazu	○ 2,075
Y. Kibe	LDP	Ito	○ 3,079
N. Sugiyama	LDP	Shimizu	× 1,797

scores thus obtained, a list of 134 persons was made. About fifty political leaders were included in the list; three generations of mayors, deputy mayors, and chief financiers; members and exmembers of the city assembly; local leaders of the political parties, chief leaders of election campaigns, and local labor union leaders. To them were added the following politicians who live out side the city; a governor, members of the prefectural assembly and Diet members. In the economic sector are included the directors of the camber of commerce. In the sociocultural sector, are included 14 leaders in public education, social movements and religious associations. Then we added young leaders and eccentric leaders who had never been any official positions to assess the dynamic power structure of the city.

We made a list of 134 and were able to interview 122 persons. Most of the remaining 12 were absent or unreachable at the time of the survey, and there were just a few who simply refused to cooperate. The 122 leaders were asked (1) to pick 20-30 people from among the list who they thought were influential in the affairs of Shimoda City, and then name the top 12; and (2) to name about 10, from among their long time acquaintances, whom they believe they can seek counsel from on important issues of the entire city or its districts. From among the

Table 4 Mayor's Election from 1968 to 1984

1968			
Candidate	Party	Hometown	Vote
M. Ishii	LDP	Inazusa	○ 5,774
T. Sano	Non	Shimoda	× 5,254
S. Suzuki	LDP	Shimoda	× 5,095
1972			
M. Ishii	LDP	Inazusa	○ 9,226
T. Sano	Non	Shimoda	× 8,384
1976			
S. Aoki	LDP	Shimoda	○ 9,540
J. Nagato	Non	Hamazaki	× 9,239
1980			
S. Aoki	LDP	Shimoda	○ 10,080
M. Ishii	Non	Inazusa	× 7,171
1984			
J. Iketani	Non	Inousawa	○ 9,667
S. Aoki	LDP	Shimoda	× 9,181

134 names in the list, 10 were deleted because they were not nominated by any of the 121 except themselves, so the final number of names on the list is 124. A further 11 of the 124 were deleted because they were either absent, unreachable or had not responded at the time of the survey (the remainder of the above 12 was not nominated). Our final sample data of leaders which we will deal with for analysis is 113.

Leaders who were listed in the top thirty in Question (1) were given one point. Those rating the 'top 12' status as 'one of the most important leaders' were given additional two points. By totalling these points, the top of the rank was the present mayor with 200 points (out of a possible total of 226 points), which means almost all the leaders nominated him. Then we calculated the weighted reputation scores which were made by giving a value to each point received from another leader based on their supposed position. As to the supposed position, the following set of equations was formulated where if one were nominated by a person who had a higher value in the weighted reputation scores, one could get more points. The value ranged from 0.00 to 1.00.

In Question (2), leaders who were political consultants with the other leader were given one point and those considered consultants by two other leaders were given two points. If they accept political consultation from all the other leaders, they would be given 112 points. We had assumed that those who had high reputation scores would also be nominated by many persons as a political consultant, so we wanted to compare the weighted reputation score with the the strength of the political consultant relationships. We calculated the degree of centrality by modifying each point received from the other leaders by their supposed position in the relationships. As to the supposed position, the following set of equations were formulated where if one were selected by a person who was higher in the degree of centrality, one could get more points. The value would range from 0.00 to 1.00. The co-relationship between the weighted reputation scores and the centrality scores is significant (0.694, p. 0.001).

Among top thirty, there are 12 political leaders, as we indicate in the remarks in Table 6 (No. 1, 3, 5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 15, 17, 20, 27, 28). Among the 12 persons, 4 are Diet members, 2 members of the prefectural assembly, one is a governor, 3 are experienced mayors and 2 are members of the city assembly. Among them two are progressives, one is the mayor of progressive coalition and the other is a Communist member of the city assembly. Also among the 12 persons: five (No. 3, 8, 10, 15, 20) are not living in the city, and the progressive politicians such as No. 1, No. 27 will have no power if they lose their official positions. We will call the remainder (No. 11, 13, 17, 28) economic leaders. They will continue to enjoy their leadership even if they lose their political positions. There are 22 economic leaders (No. 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30). There are none of the socio-cultural leaders among the top thirty. No. 2 is a stockholder of a major national pharmaceutical corporation. No. 4 is a owner and president of a construction company which is the biggest company in the Shimoda City, and fifth largest in Shizuoka Prefecture. No. 6 is a president of Chamber of Commerce, No. 7 the president of the Fisherman's Association, No. 9 is the president of the Credit Union. No. 11 is an ex-mayor and the a president electrical manufacturing company, No. 12 is the owner and president of a hotel. Thus economic leaders

Table 6 The List of the Leaders Who Are Ranked Within the Upper 38 by Reputation Scores

Rank	Weighted Sum of Reputation Scores	Non-weighted Sum of Reputation Scores	Degree of Centrality in P. C. R. NW	Number of Nominators	Remarks
1	1.000	200	0.768	55	Mayor
2	0.865	152	0.359	9	
3	0.813	141	0.641	14	Governor
4	0.810	140	0.197	14	
5	0.774	159	0.878	51	Member of P. A.
6	0.766	137	0.827	33	
7	0.666	109	0.688	23	
8	0.629	109	0.640	14	Diet Member
9	0.620	112	0.612	19	
10	0.585	99	0.459	13	Diet Member
11	0.568	106	0.969	36	Ex-Mayor
12	0.545	113	0.696	28	
13	0.539	95	0.325	9	
14	0.538	93	0.430	20	
15	0.536	96	0.203	8	
16	0.429	83	0.301	24	
17	0.399	64	0.605	22	Former Mayor
18	0.392	56	0.064	4	
19	0.381	51	0.568	17	
20	0.364	52	0.081	4	
21	0.363	71	0.148	8	
22	0.352	50	0.165	5	
23	0.339	55	0.266	10	
24	0.337	62	0.163	8	
25	0.325	71	0.150	14	
26	0.319	68	0.122	18	
27	0.315	69	0.062	13	Meber of C. A.
28	0.305	53	0.184	14	Meber of C. A.
29	0.295	62	0.267	14	
30	0.290	47	0.122	8	
31	0.280	59	0.205	15	
32	0.269	63	0.741	20	
33	0.240	52	0.287	7	
34	0.237	41	0.223	7	
35	0.236	39	0.052	5	
36	0.213	42	0.278	14	
37	0.197	53	0.081	14	
38	0.193	36	0.120	8	
	0.456 *	83.15 *	0.354 *	16.31 *	
	0.158 **	29.90 **	0.128 **	6.42 **	

* : average of upper 38 leaders P. A. : Prefectural Assembly

** : average of 113 leaders C. A. : City Assembly

Note : Non-weighted sum reputation scores is calculated by following method.

$$P_i = \sum_{j=1}^n Z_{ij}$$

P_i indicates reputation score of Mr. i .

Z_{ij} indicates the score of Mr. i given by Mr. j in the (given-giver) matrix of reputation scores.

Weighted sum of reputation scores is calculated by following methods.

$$P_i = \lambda^{-1} \sum_{j=1}^n P_j \times Z_{ij}, \quad Z_{ii} = 1.0 \quad (i=1, 2, 3, \dots, n)$$

indicates eigen values ; $P \times Z = \lambda \cdot P, \quad \lambda = \sum_{i=1}^n P_i$

are owners of local companies by local capital, and represent local interests except for leader No. 2. They are generally against the big national tourist industries such as Tokyu and Seibu, but some of them are ready to work with big business if it is in pursuit their own interest. There are six Tokyu joint company in the city but none of their president are in top thirty. The conservative political leaders in the city are at present the mediators of the existing conflicts between local capitals and national big business.

The present mayor, in June 1984, defeated Liberal Democratic Party (conservative party) official candidate (No. 11) who was the mayor at that time. The present mayor was a candidate of a coalition between the Socialist Party, the Communist Party and the local labor unions. Leaders among the top thirty are generally conservative politicians except for this mayor (No. 1). The ex-mayor failed in his re-election because of his inability to mobilize the resources of the conservatives. Progressives (liberals in the U.S. sense) made a coalition to stand against the mayor at that time. The program of the coalition was to oppose the economic invasion of two big tourist industry companies to protect the interests of the small and family businesses as well as the jobs of the laborers, farmers and fishermen, and to re-vitalize local economic activities.

No. 1 got 9,667 votes and No. 11 got 9,181 votes. The difference of 486 votes means that among conservatives there were supporters of No. 1. It is said that Seibu stayed neutral, supporting No. 1 only in the last stages. In the last election in 1985 Liberal Democratic Party got 20 seats out of 26. Among LDP there are two fractions one is supporters of a mayor and the other is a ex-mayor. Some of the latter faction secretly supported No. 1.

Figure 1 is a graph of the political distance between relationships which is given by the traits of each person. Each leader was asked to nominate about ten leaders with whom he consulted about political matters. According to their answers, we measured the relationship between the two leaders under consideration as +1 if they were nominated by a third leader, or if they were not nominated by the same third leader. If one of the two readers were nominated by a third leader, but the other was not, we counted the relationship between the two as -1. Then we tallied the average scores from these data for each pair of leaders. The value would range from -1.0 to +1.0. Then we calculated all the relationships between each of the 113 leaders, and thus made a matrix. From this matrix we got each leaders average value, which means the degree of conctrality in the network of political consultant relationship. The value would range -1.0 to +1.0.

From this scale we assumed that the leaders on the plus side of the horizontal axis are conservatives with more influence, while the leaders on minus side of the horizontal axis are progressives with more influence. From Figure 1, we can consider the ex-mayor as conservative and the present mayor as more or less progressive. As to the vertical axis, we assume the leaders on the upper side are innovaters and those on the lower are ritualists.

Figure 2 shows the network of political consultant relationships and political attitudes about the mayor's election. *Y* indicates the supporters of No. 1 (mayor), *Z* indicates the supporters of No. 11 (ex-mayor). From this figure we can see those who supported No. 1 are situated on the minum side of the horizontal axis and those who supported No. 11 on the




Figure 1 Network Map of Political Consultant Relationships and Reputation Scores.

These figure are drawn with factor analysis of the correlation of structural equivalence. How to draw these figures is explained as follows; First, we calculate the correlations of structural equivalence (C_{ij}) with a next equation.

$$C_{ij} = \frac{\sum_{k=1}^n Z_{ki}^2 Z_{kj}^2 \sum_{k=1}^n (Z_{ki}-1)^2 (Z_{kj}-1)^2 - \sum_{k=1}^n Z_{ki}^2 (Z_{kj}-1)^2 \sum_{k=1}^n Z_{kj}^2 (Z_{ki}-1)^2}{\left\{ \sum_{k=1}^n Z_{ki}^2 \sum_{k=1}^n (Z_{ki}-1)^2 \sum_{k=1}^n (Z_{kj}=1)^2 \sum_{k=1}^n Z_{kj}^2 \right\}^{1/2}}$$

- n : number of actors
- Z_{ij} : the relationship from i to j
- $Z_{ij}=1$, if i has a linkage to j
- $Z_{ij}=0$, if i has no linkage to j
- $-1.0 \leq C_{ij} \leq +1.0$

If i and j have identical relationships with all the actors, $C_{ij}=1.0$, while if they have no relationships in common, $C_{ij}=-1.0$. Second we make factor analysis these coefficients matrix, then plot these actors on their factor loading scores of axes I and II.




Figure 2 Network of Political Consultant Relationships and the Voting Attitudes of Mayor's Election

Note: On the above mentioned network map of political consultant relationships, the attitudes of the Mayor's election are described.

plus side. At the center we see a mixture of both, which shows that both candidates were in keen competition in the campaign.

When No. 1 started to run his campaign, a written agreement was made between the Socialist Party, the Communist Party and the local unions association, which said:

Shimoda city where we live now faces great difficulties. Because of the numerous disasters and depression, the economy of our city has been greatly damaged and since 1977 the population of the city has been declining.

Under such conditions we should make all efforts to protect the lives of the people of Shimoda. The present Administrations that control the city government has been standing for the interests of a few rich people and against the interests of the ordinary

people for long time.

The consensus among the citizen about the construction of the community center and the problems of water supply has been neglected.

The present mayor has no concrete policy to conquer the depression or to revitalize the local economics and culture and to make Shimoda attractive for its citizen, especially for the younger generation....

The general goals of the city government we are aiming for are:

1. To realize the establishment of the self-government of the citizens and to protect themselves from the illegitimate interference of the national and prefectural governments.

2. To develop indigenous industries such as tourism, commerce, agriculture and the forest and fishery industries.

3. To establish a peaceful Shimoda that is able to declare itself 'a non-nuclear city' and to make the Constitution useful in our everyday lives.

Candidate No. 1 accepted this agreement and expressed his willingness to practice it. As for the basic problems of the city he suggested calling a convention on the organization of 'An association to vitalize Shimoda.' Thus a loose coalition was made between candidate No. 1 and the progressive elements.

After he got the position of a mayor, No. 1 faced difficulties in carrying out his policies as a progressive candidate of a coalition. Above all, two issues which the new mayor had inherited from the ex-mayor caused trouble. One was the conflict brought on by the renovation of a big supermarket downtown, and the other was the issue of the construction of a community center. We will see these two issues in the next chapter.

IV. The Issues and the Decision Making

The first of the two issues we will discuss is the conflict between the branch of a chain of supermarkets in the Shizuoka prefecture and the local retailers in downtown Shimoda. Already a relatively big supermarket built in 1977 by Tokyu, caused some troubles between Tokyu and the local retailers. In 1979 another supermarket affiliated to a prefectural bus company folded owing to the economic slump. A department store company (Y) which already owned two stores in the town bought the stocks of the supermarket from the bus company and tried to reopen it in January 1983.

The Association of Shopkeepers which consist of unions of vegetable and fruit stores, of fish shops, butchers, wine shops and restaurants and others made the Citizen's Association prevent the opening of this third branch. A chronological history of the events is as follows;

Feb. 28, 1983	Y department store proposed negotiation to the Citizen's Association.
March 2	The Citizen's Association submitted a petition to freeze the reopening plan.
March 29	The resolution for freezing the plan was adopted in the City Assembly.
April 12	Sit-in movement to prevent the remodeling construction.
April 20 to May 9	A blockade by the Association of Shopkeepers (ASK).
April 30	An election of the city assembly.
May 9	Y store stated that they would start negotiation with ASK. The blockade was resolved.
Feb. 28, 1984	The Mayor (No. 11), the chairman of the city assembly and the

- president of the Chamber of Commerce presented a compromise plan, which proposed to postpone the reopening till May 1985.
- May 21 A decision was made to postpone the reopening till April 1987 by mayor.
- July 2 The new mayor's inauguration.
- Jan. 11, 1985 The mayor met the Y store executives. Y store declared that the construction would start in early February.
- Feb. 16 The construction was started, the mayor's proposition was ignored, and Y store declared it would reopen on March 20th.
- March 11 The mayor answered the assembly that it was impossible to postpone the reopening, however it was our fruit not to make reopen within two years.
- March 21 Y store is now open.

On February 19, 1985 the president of the Citizen's Association, the president of the Fishmongers Union, the president of the Union of vegetable shops, the president of the butchers Union, the president of the Japanese Liquor Shops Union and the president of the Retail Association made following statement;

Dear president of Y store,

Mayor will be arrested by the police because he said he would prevent by force the reopening of your store.

From February 16, you began construction on the building ignoring the orders to stop by the mayor, the president of Chamber of Commerce and the chairman of the City Assembly. The mayor asked Y store to obey the mediation that froze the re-opening till April 30, 1987; and he declared that if Y-store were to continue construction, he would take drastic measures, even to the point of risking arrest by the police...

However this strong threat was hollow, and Y store prospered immediately upon its reopening. A matter such as the reopening of Y store, is not one that should be decided politically. It was an economic invasion by Y company under the disguise of the reopening of an old supermarket. It should not have been an issue for the city assembly or mayor. One of the reasons why this became a political issue was that both the mayor and city assembly elections were held and conservative politicians were forced to pretend to support the demands of the small scale merchants. The Association of Citizens was mainly composed of these merchants who did not necessarily represent the universal interests of all the citizens. The people in the downtown area are pleased with the reopening of the department store.

On this issue, the 113 leaders were asked 'with whom did you discuss the Y store issue? Please select about ten persons from the list of 113 leaders.' Then they were asked to express their attitude towards the immediate reopening of Y store. Both the mayor and the ex-mayor expressed their disapproval. The tendency of all the leaders, if a simple average is calculated, was for approval of the immediate reopening. But when we take into account the leaders' degree of centrality in the network of issue consultant relationship and their weighted reputation scores, the weighted average of their attitudes turns out to be the inverse, that is, on the side of disapproval. Nevertheless, if we were to assume that not just the mayor but also the ex-mayor were to change their attitudes to the approval side, the weighted average of all their attitudes would change to the side of approval.

From this evidence, we can say that in the free market the resolution to the issue of the reopening could have been reached rather spontaneously. Even if political leaders such as the mayor and the assembly men could mediate between the two conflicting elements, they could only do so by postponing the reopening. They could not stop Y store indefinitely.

The second issue concerns the construction of the community center—the location and the style of building. Originally the plan to build the center was submitted by a majority of citizens. In the beginning of the 1970's the mayor at that time (No. 11) asked the Council of Tourist Accommodations to look into the matter. In 1975 the Council submitted their report in which they recommended building the community center. However the city government shelved the report. In 1980 the controlling stockholder of a pharmaceutical company (No. 2) proposed giving a donation for the construction of the center with one of their conditions being that Kashima Construction Company would be given the contract. Because of these conditions, the city government did not accept the proposal. In 1981 the city government decided to build the center not taking advantage of the donation. It also decided the location of the center. However the plan was not put into action because of the disagreement among a wide range of citizens over the place and size and the style of the building. In September 1985, the council recommended the center be located in downtown Shimoda, which also had been the mayor's campaign promises. But the the city assembly has not made a final decision yet.

Our survey concerning the city hall problems was done in November in 1984. At that time the only information available to the citizens was the mayor's campaign statement. To examine the conditions on which the mayor's community center proposition could be accepted, the attitudes and the network of the consultanting relationships of the leaders about this issue were researched. The leaders are asked 'With whom have you consulted on this issue? Please mention the names of ten persons.' The data on the leaders' attitudes toward the mayor's community center plans were collected in terms of pro., undecided and con. From these results, we would like to suggest the possibility of a resolution to this issue. In order to separate these three attitudes, the following operation procedures were chosen;

- 1) It was decided that in this operation we would select some leaders who would be critical in the decision to build a center.

- 2) Next it was decided that we researched what would happen by operationally changing certain leaders' attitudes to the opposite side or undecided.

- 3) Next to test what would happen by operationally changing certain leaders' attitudes, it was decided that in this network of consultant relationships created for this issue, we made sure there were no actual relationships between the selected leaders (see, 1). Then we had them operationally consult with each other, and operationally overlap each other in their own ego networks artificially.

- 4) It was decided that the attitude of each of the 113 leaders was influenced by their own interests on this issue.

- 5) It was decided that each individual's attitude was influenced by their own centrality in the network of the issue consultant relationships.

Table 7 Conditional Analysis of Problem Resolutonal Potentialities

Place (1) Style	uncon dition	A · C	H · C	M · C	A · D	A · I	A + I + M
MX1 (1)	0.1604	0.1604	0.1604	0.1604	0.1604	0.1604	0.1604
(2)	- 0.1972	- 0.2064	- 0.2064	- 0.2064	- 0.2037	- 0.1972	- 0.1972
MX2 (1)	0.1189	0.1198	0.1198	0.1198	0.1245	0.1198	0.1198
(2)	- 0.1587	- 0.1679	- 0.1679	- 0.1651	- 0.1648	- 0.1587	- 0.1587
MX3 (1)	0.3037	0.3037	0.3037	0.3037	0.3404	0.3130	0.3171
(2)	0.2030	- 0.1438	0.1309	0.1545	0.0425	0.2209	0.2310
MX4 (1)	0.2475	0.2475	0.2475	0.2475	0.3098	0.2651	0.2686
(2)	0.1829	- 0.1879	0.0516	0.1423	- 0.0181	0.2020	0.2112
MX5 (1)	0.4202	0.4202	0.4204	0.4204	0.4721	0.4388	0.4477
(2)	0.3321	- 0.3248	0.1381	0.2683	- 0.0463	0.3640	0.3761
R P (1)	0.9204	0.9204	0.9204	0.9204	0.9720	0.9388	0.9477
(2)	0.8321	0.1752	0.6381	0.7683	0.4537	0.8640	0.8761
V (1)	0.2944	0.2944	0.2944	0.2944	0.3282	0.3021	0.3000
(2)	0.2754	0.3046	0.1863	0.2652	0.1952	0.2775	0.2808
T V	0.5698	0.5990	0.4811	0.5595	0.5234	0.5796	0.5809

Note: A. C. means "if Mr. A stands against the style issue," A. P. means "if Mr. A stands for the style issue," A. D. means 'if Mr. A is undecided.' - mark indicates negative values. A+I means loose coalition when Mr. A and Mr. I nominate each other as a consultant mate concerning with the issue. I+R=T means that Mr. R and Mr. T are in terms of tight coalition between themselves on one hand and that Mr. I and both of them are in terms of loose coalition on the other.

MX1 ($- .5 \leq MX1 \leq + .5$) indicates simple means over pro. & con. attitudes of local community leaders towards the issues of the city hall construction concerning with the place and style of building (X1).

MX2 ($- .5 \leq MX2 \leq + .5$) indicates means over the X1 multiplied by the degree of interest which local community leaders cherish towards the issue general (X2).

MX3 ($- .5 \leq MX3 \leq + .5$) indicates means over the X2's multiplied by the degrees of centrality of local nominated as consultants concerning to the issue of the city hall construction (X3). As to calculating of the degree of centrality in the network of consultant relationships emergent from the issue, see Table 3.

MX4 ($- .5 \leq MX4 \leq + .5$) indicates means over the X3's multiplied by degrees of power which local community leaders expect themselves mutually to consume for the resolution of the city hall construction issues concerning with the place and style of building (X4). The degree of power is derived from the

6) It was decided that the attitude of each of the 113 leaders is reciprocally influenced by the degree of their own centrality. The degree of centrality is shown as the score of a leader who is expected by others to mobilize their general resources as indicated by the weighted reputation scores in proportion to their own demands by which we mean the strength of the leader's desire regardless of pro. or con. for the solutions of these specific problems.

7) We assume that the attitude of all the 113 leaders is influenced by the degree of the leader's desire for a solution to the two problems. It is supposed that the degree of desire for a solution of the two problems by the whole group of 113 leaders will be formed in proportion to the degree of centrality in mutual expectation.

From these procedures, we developed five types (MX1, MX2, MX3, MX4, MX5, see Table 7) of average value regarding the attitudes towards these problems: and charted the

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A · C I + R	A · D I + R	A · C K · P	A · C, K · P K + I	A · C S · P	A · C, S · P S + I	A · C K · P, S · P	A · C, K · P, S · P K + S + I
0.1604	0.1604	0.1604	0.1604	0.1604	0.1604	0.1604	0.1604
- 0.1972	- 0.1944	- 0.1972	- 0.1972	- 0.1972	- 0.1972	- 0.1881	- 0.1881
0.1198	0.1245	0.1198	0.1198	0.1198	0.1198	0.1198	0.1198
- 0.1624	- 0.1593	- 0.1587	- 0.1587	- 0.1605	- 0.1605	- 0.1514	- 0.1514
0.3073	0.3437	0.3037	0.3077	0.3037	0.3083	0.3037	0.3126
- 0.1410	0.0461	- 0.1425	- 0.1356	- 0.0989	- 0.0806	- 0.0976	- 0.0673
0.2523	0.3143	0.2475	0.2565	0.2475	0.2581	0.2475	0.2618
- 0.1973	- 0.0169	- 0.1970	- 0.1789	- 0.1658	- 0.1468	- 0.1650	- 0.1130
0.4234	0.4728	0.4204	0.4261	0.4204	0.4229	0.4204	0.4284
- 0.3237	- 0.0429	- 0.3223	- 0.3089	- 0.2786	- 0.2539	- 0.2764	- 0.2004
0.9234	0.9728	0.9204	0.9261	0.9204	0.9229	0.9204	0.9284
0.1763	0.4571	0.1777	0.1911	0.2214	0.2462	0.2236	0.2997
0.2980	0.3324	0.2944	0.3011	0.2944	0.3051	0.2944	0.3056
0.3043	0.1964	0.3055	0.2896	0.2976	0.2892	0.2985	0.2819
0.6028	0.5288	0.5999	0.5907	0.5920	0.5943	0.5928	0.5875

following set of equations ($Z=|X3| \times R, V=P \times |X3|, P=V \times R \rightarrow P \times Z=\lambda \times P$). Z indicates matrix of the degree's of mutual expectation according to which local community leaders of the degree's of mutual expectation according to which local community leaders would consume their own power for the resolution of the city hall construction issue. P indicates vector of the degree's of power of which local community leaders could dispose. R indicates vector of the reputation scores which local community leaders give each other according to their images of their leaderships.

V indicates vector of the degree's of demand for resolution of the city hall construction issues.

MX5 ($- .5 \leq MX5 \leq + .5$) indicates means over the X4's divided by the degree of demand above mentioned (X5).

RP ($0 \leq RP \leq +1.0$) indicates the degree's of potentiality according to which the city hall construction problems could be resolved by local community leaders.

TV ($0 \leq TV \leq +1.0$) indicate total demand for resolution of the city hall construction issue.

Mr. A is No.11, ex-mayor. Mr. I is No.1, mayor. Mr. H is No.6, president of chamber of commerce. Mr. K is No.4, owner of construction Co. Mr. M is young active leader. Mr. R is chairman of the council of the city hall. Mr. S is No. 24, president of tourist bureau.

degree of potential resolution to the community center construction problems by local community leaders (RP), and the strength of desire for a solution of the problems (TV). We focused on the architectural style of the center building. In the case of the unconditional procedure, the mayor's proposition would be rejected by the leaders. According to the fourth procedure, even when the interests of the leaders were taken into account the mayor's proposition was still rejected by them. But according to the fifth and sixth and seventh procedures, his proposition was accepted. Thus it seemed that his proposition would be accepted if in the real decision making process their weighted reputation scores, total demands for the solution and their own degree of centrality in this issue's network of consultant relationships could be taken into account.

In the case of the conditional procedure number two, it was decided that the ex-mayor

would change his attitude to con. The mayor's proposition would be rejected if the procedures from four to seven were taken into account. But using the procedure number three as well as number two, when No. 4 and the mayor had a close mutual consultant relationships on this issue consultant and No. 4 could changed his opinion to pro., the mayor's proposition would only be rejected to a slightly less extend than otherwise. Even though the reputation rank of the ex-mayor is only No. 11, he could be intimate with No. 4 and the mayor (No. 1) and the fact that the mayor's proposition would be less likely to be accepted under the disapproval of the ex-mayor shows the high potential power of the ex-mayor on such issues as the construction plan of the community center. However, we must limit our conjecture to those simulation procedures, because the ex-mayor retired from the world of politics after that election.

V. Network and Power Structure

In this chapter we would like to analyse the community power structure through the network of 113 leaders. 113 leaders have many relationships about many matters, and from these relationships we can make network maps about each matter. At first, we asked, 'among your contacts with whom do you consult about important political issues concerning the whole city district or your local community, please nominate ten persons.' From this data we made a network map of political consultants. Next we asked, 'please nominate ten persons with whom you talk intimately.' From this question we made a network map of friendships. Thirdly we asked about the problems of the community center 'with whom have you consulted on the issue of the construction of community center? Please list ten persons.' From this we made a network map of consultant relationships concerning of the center.

The network map of political consultant relationships is shown in Figure 3. The calculation of the distance between the positions of each leader in the map has already been explained in Chapter 3. In this Figure we added lines between leaders when at least one of both leaders nominated the other. Attention should be paid to the fact that the close distance between two leaders itself reveals a close relationship. From this Figure we can observe that the selection of political consultants does not necessarily mean a closed political distance between the two. The line is drawn between close points but it can also be drawn between points that are greatly separated from each other.

On a matrix according to their answers about friendships, we scored the relationship between nominee and nominator $+1.0$ when the two leaders nominated each other, or were nominated as an intimate friend by the same third leader. We calculated the relationship between the two -1.0 when one of the two leaders was nominated by a third leader but not the other one. Then we took the average score from these data for every pair of leaders. The value would range from -1.0 to $+1.0$. Then we calculated all the relationships between each of the 113 leaders, and made our matrix. From this matrix we printed out each leaders' average value in rows shuffled to show the degree of closeness to a common pattern of friendship relationships. Thus when a leader's value is $+1.0$, we can assume he has a normal pattern of relationships, and when a leader's value is -1.0 , we can assume he has a unique pattern. On a horizontal axis we can say that the leaders on the right side chose

friends by conservative ideological criteria, and those on the left by progressive. On the vertical axis, we can say that the leaders on the upper side choose friends on a particularistic criteria and the persons on the down side chose friends on a universalistic criteria.

As shown in Figure 4, in the right and upper quadrant we find the all the politically powerful leaders except No. 1 and No. 12. This means that the conservative leaders have steady and normal pattern of relationships characterized by particularistic and traditional ones corresponding with vertical patronage and service relations. On the left side we find the progressive leaders. For example, we find No. 27 (the Communist city assembly member) and the other union leaders. No. 1, the mayor is on this side. On the lower side we find the leaders who are members of the Junior Chamber of Commerce and the informal leaders of the Shimoda




Figure 3 Network Map of Political Consultant Relationships

Note: As to the method of drawing figures, see Figure 1.

Revitalizing Festival.

Figure 5 shows the network map of friendship relationships plotted with the voting patterns from the mayor's election. This figure shows a high corelation between friendship relationships and voting attitudes. This corelation is even higher than that between political consultant relationships and voting attitudes. Most of the leaders of the young generation who have nontraditional criteria for their selection of friends also supported the mayor.

We made Figure 6, by drawing a line between leaders when at least one of the leaders nominated the other. The conservatives who are shown on the right side of Figure 2 are situated in the upper right quadrant of Figure 6, and in this latter figure we can see a clique of interrelationship which did not appear in the former. This means that the conservative




Figure 4 Network Map of Friend Relationships and Reputation Scores

Note: As to the method of drawing figures, see Figure 1.

leaders have traditional diffuse friendships. Figure 3 shows that they have consultant relationships beyond their political stances. Figure 6 shows that all the 113 leaders can be divided into three sub-groups in which a similarity of voting patterns can be seen. This would indicate that the network of friendship relationships would be latently determined by the political consultant relationships. As shown in Figure 6 there are some mildly scattered influential leaders among the conservatives who have similar friendship relationships patterns. The progressives who are shown on the left side of Figure 3, are situated on the left side of Figure 6, and in the latter case we can recognize a clear distinction between some radicals such as members of the communist and socialist parties and the union leaders on the one hand, and some liberals such as the substantial supporters of the mayor on the other. On the lower side




Figure 5 Network Map of Friend Relationships and the Voting Attitudes of Mayor's Election

Note: As to the method of drawing figures, see Figure 1.

of Figure 6, we find the independent friendship pattern of younger business generation.

From these analyses we can tentatively conclude that the network of friendship relationships may reflect the basis of the community power structure more accurately than that of political consultant relationships. The fact that leaders who share the same pattern of friendship relationships are in close networks of political consultant relationships demonstrates that cultural and normative factors are determinants in the political power structure of the community of Shimoda.

To make Figure 7 we calculated the degree of closeness to the common pattern of consultant relationships regarding the community center issue. When a leader's value is $+1.0$, we assume he has a normal pattern of relationships, and when it is -1.0 , he has a unique pattern.




Figure 6 Network Map of Friend Relationships

Note: As to the method of drawing figures, see Figure 1.

As to the horizontal axis, we find the leaders who have old influential consultants such as No. 7 and No. 29 on the right side, and those who have many active consultants regardless of their political distances on the left side. As to the vertical axis, we find leaders who are politically conservative on the upper side and those who are politically progressive and culturally prestigious on the lower side.

At the center of the network map, there is the mayor's cliques containing No. 12 (who ranks fifth in political consultant centrality, and who is a relative of No. 2) and the chairman of the council for the construction of the community center. In this network an ex-mayor (who ranks first in consultant centrality on this issue), No. 5, No. 6 and No. 16 have the same attitude towards the style of the city hall, and belonging to one clique, and are distant from




Figure 7 An Emergent Structure of the Attitudes of Leaders About the Issue of Community Center Construction

the mayor's clique and others. The attitudes of the 113 leaders towards the style of the community center which are plotted in the network map are irrespective of their inter relationships. As to the style, Z indicates pro. for its exclusive use as a theater, Y indicates con. From this Figure we only can say that it is very difficult to reach a definite conclusion concerning to the style. Both of the mayor and the ex-mayor are pro. wanting a theater, but the actual realization of a center depends on the drift of the clique of the ex-mayor and others.

Figure 8 is a network map of consultant relationships about the community center issue. From this Figure, the concentration to the mayor's clique and others can be discerned. Such a concentration has not been seen in the other network maps (see, Figure 3 and Figure 6), which means that the resolution of this issue is administrative. Nevertheless it is a fact that




Figure 8 An Emergent Network of Consultant Relationships Between the Leaders About the Issue of Community Center Construction

there is no talented adviser around the mayor to prevent him from resolving this issue exclusively on his administrative initiative. There is another clique of local intelligentsia and political progressives which is situated at the opposite extreme from the above mentioned clique of the ex-mayor and others. In short we concluded that four cliques representative of the sub-groups would emerge from the resolution of this issue and that these four cliques would be in balance temporarily. We believe that the dynamics of these four cliques are largely limited by the community power structure in Shimoda city.

VI. Conclusion

Among power structure researchers in the U.S., there have been debates on whether an elite model or a pluralistic model is suitable for the analysis of the actual structure of power in American society both on national level and local community levels. However in the U.S., general reliance on American democracy characterizes all arguments on power structure. Even those who describe American society as one that is now ruled by a handful of omnipotent elite also count on the restorative potentiality of American democracy.

In Japan the people's sovereignty was realized only after World War II. Under the emperor's sovereignty in the pre-war period, the emperor formally ruled the Japanese nation and society. In rural areas at that time, landlords exploited tenant farmers and ruled the village communities. In contrast to the relationship between capitalists and laborers, the relationship between landlords and tenants was based in a solid status system. Exploitation by landlords of tenants was visible. Tenants brought bags of rice which they produced to the storehouses of the landlords by themselves. Also in the village community, landlords dominated not only the tenants but also farmer owners by holding the rights to use of communal resources such as irrigation and waste land. Also they stood at the apex of the hierarchy based on land ownership.

After the war, this landlord system had been dissolved by the land reform. People were given equal rights including voting rights. However even under the new Constitution the emperor still has a slightly privileged position. According to the new Constitution, the emperor is the symbol of the state and of the unity of the people, and his position is to be succeeded by his eldest son. Traditionally primogeniture is the predominant pattern of the succession in the land ownership of the household. Even today, the graves of a typical Japanese family is a family owned grave, and those who lie in the same grave are kinsmen of direct descendant and their wives. Those of collateral descendant are expected to establish new graves of their own, and they are succeeded again by their eldest son. This rule of succession is just the same as that of the position of the emperor. In Japan equality under the law does not exclude the dominance of males over females, the eldest son over the other sons nor the direct descendant over collateral descendants.

As to the community power structure, traditional power structure still remains where the traditional community more or less functions. Such pre-modern power structure has been retained by big business and corporations. Therefore in Japan, corporate conservatism—not corporate liberalism—and grassroots conservatism—not grassroots democracy—are still predomi-

nant in national and local politics. At the national level, members of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) occupy the majority of the Diet seat. This conservative party has come into power as the agent of big business. However LDP candidates in local electoral districts are not necessarily supported by big business in those districts. Big business supports LDP on the national level to maintain the present order against counterforces. But this does not mean it always supports all LDP members. There are many particularistic conditions in the innumerable local government. A controlling stock owner of big pharmaceutical company in Shimoda, for example, is not much interested in the political affairs of that city.

Also in Japan, conservatives are not capitalistic conservates but traditional ones. But traditional communal relationships are not necessarily connected with the hierarchy relationships. Non-industrial society has, not only vertical relationships but also horizontal communal relationships. It is the conservative elements who try to revitalize the vertical relationships in order to maintain capitalistic social order. On the other hand, radicals seek to mobilize horizontal relationships in order to realize authentic self-government. Shimoda's case shows that in local elections it is quite possible to realize anti-LDP coalitions under the conditions in which conservatives have an overwhelming influence.

When we discuss about class struggle or class domination, we must take notice of the fact that in modern society we are not able to visualize the ruling class. Also there is no clear distinction between the capitalist class and the laborer class. Of course, there is a clear visual distinction between the rich and the poor. But this distinction is based on quantitative differences not on qualitative. Also logically the ruling class is not the same as the rich nor the ruled is the poor. However the hierarchical order based on money ownership functions in fact favorably for the governing class. Therefore inequality in economic resources is one of the most important factors, and under conditions of legal equality, the capitalist class which has the means of production is able to be the governing class and to enjoy their power.

As we mentioned earlier, even in a small local town like Shimoda where the conservative party has centralized power (far from the pluralistic model) and operates a dictatorial government, the progressive forces can elect their candidate to a major position if an effective coalition is made. However this does not mean that conservative politics lose their influence significantly and the traditional communal order is weakened severely. Whether the elements represented by Mr. Iketani could increase their influence or not depends on the integrative power of the coalition. On the other there has been a great fear that he could be co-opted to the establishment. In this case, he would run in the next election as a LDP candidate.

The political issues in the near future are 1) between conservatives and progressives, which will take the initiative in the revitalization of traditional factors in the community, *buraku*, 2) whether the progressives can preserve the communal egalitarian relationships in the community against the economic aggression of big business.

If we review historically, Shimoda has developed through four stages; 1) the traditional rule in the community by landlords and the owners of fishing boats till the end of the 19th Century, 2) the owners and managers of ship building company, bus company and inns and hotels rule the downtown area, whereas the respected members rule the countryside in much

the same conditions that existed in the village community, in the prewar period, 3) after the opening of the Izukyu railroad, contradictions between the domination of the big businesses and the traditional elements, 4) and now people in Shimoda stand at the crossroads of whether to follow further modernization pressed for by big business or clarify, an alternative life style and protect people's lives.

In Japan the rule of big business has developed side by side with the rule of a centralized power along the lines of the traditional emperor's system. To stand against such one dimensional control, those who live in the local community and cherish indigenous values must realize political and cultural pluralism through the strong self-government.

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Key Words

Community, Power, Decision Making and Network.

地域権力構造の実証的研究

— S 市 の 事 例 —

河村 望*, 高橋 和宏*, 迫田 耕作**

*東京都立大学都市研究センター・人文学部 **愛知大学
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はじめに

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- IV 争点と政策決定
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要 約

地域社会の権力構造の分析は、これまで主としてアメリカでおこなわれてきたが、本稿はそれを日本の一地方小都市でおこなった。その結果、アメリカでコミュニティという地域単位でパワーをもっている人がビジネスマンであるのにたいし、日本の小都市でパワーをもっている人と地元の人びとからみなされているのは、政治家や議員が多く、日本の地域社会では民間人はパワー（権力）をもつものとみなされていないことがわかった。また、日本の小都市では地域のまとまりは、町内会・部落会などの単位でみられるのであって、とくに農村部では大字ないし部落（区）が重要であって、重要な決定も行政の次元とは独自に部落でなされることが多い。日本は資本主義の発達にもかかわらず、古い共同体的関係が残っていて、それが地域の権力構造を大きく左右している。

Key Words (キーワード)

地域社会 (Community), 権力 (Power), 政策決定 (Desision Making), ネットワーク (Network)